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I INTRODUCTION
Trade usage1 has always played an important role in the legal regulation
of international sales. For example, trade usage is used to deﬁne the
concept of reasonable time in which the buyer or seller has to take
certain actions as required by the substantive law,2 to determine whether
formalities are required for contract formation,3whether an offer can be
accepted through silence or conduct,4 a contract concluded where the
* BA LLB LLM LLD (Stellb).
1 In this article, unless otherwise indicated, trade and mercantile custom are used as
synonyms for trade usage. Also note that this article does not focus on trade practices or
so-called courses of dealing between individual parties but is limited to a discussion of
practices that have been recognised as usages of the trade and, thus, bind anyone who is active
in that trade.
2 For instance, where the buyer has to examine the goods for defects and notify the seller of
any non-conformity, trade usage can determine the method or time of examination or when
notice of non-conformity is to be given: CLOUT case no 892 (Kantonsgericht Schaffhausen,
Switzerland 27 January 2004); CLOUT case no 423 (Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria 27 August
1999) (trade usage on method of examination), available at www.cisg.at/1_22399x.htm,
accessed on 22 July 2015;Helsinki Court of Appeal (Steel plates case), Finland 29 January 1998
(usage of trade that seller should be present during examination), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980129f5.html, accessed on 22 July April 2015; CLOUT case no
292 (Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken, Germany 13 January 1993) (usage on time within
which notice of non-conformity is to be given).
3 OGH 10 Ob 518/95 (Austria 6 February 1996), available at http://www.unilex.info/
case.cfm?id=202, accessed on 28 July 2015; Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp v Barr
Laboratories Inc 201 F. Supp. 2d 236 Federal District Court, United States 10 May 2002
(industry usage that contract can be concluded on the basis of implied supply commitments),
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020510u1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015.
4 Rechtbank van Koophandel Veurne (Leeks case), Belgium 19 March 2003 (silence can
amount to acceptance where agreement of the parties, practices or usage exist), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030319b1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015; Bezirksgericht
Sissach (Summer cloth collection case), Switzerland 5 November 1998 (effect of silence as
acceptance to a letter of conﬁrmation even if that amounts to the modiﬁcation of contractual
terms), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981105s1.html, accessed on 22 July
2015; CLOUT case no 347 (Oberlandesgericht Dresden, Germany 9 July 1998) (buyer who
sent commercial letter of conﬁrmation did not establish existence of international usage by
which silence constitutes assent), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
980709g1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015; Appellate Court Frankfurt (Chocolate products
case), Germany 5 July 1995 (no international trade usage of industry that silence would
amount to acceptance of letter of conﬁrmation), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/950705g1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015; Civil Court Basel (Textiles case), Switzerland
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goods or price is not certain or ascertainable,5 the price or time of
payment revised after conclusion,6 or whether interest can be claimed in
cases where there is no contractual agreement in this respect.7
The normative character of unwritten mercantile custom can be
traced back to the Middle Ages when trade was regulated by the law of
the merchants (the lex mercatoria).8 The ancient lex mercatoria con-
sisted of norms or rules in the form of customs generated by merchants
for their own use and, thus, as a form of independent self-regulation.
These norms were adjudicated in specialised merchant courts by
commercial judges.9 In the nineteenth century, due to an increased
awareness of nationalism, commercial custom was absorbed into the
laws of nation-states and for the rest predominantly continued to exist
on the basis of party autonomy, either as express or implied contractual
terms.10
As a result, business practices in trades such as those of the cotton
brokers, the corn trade and the timber merchants started to compensate
for the inadequacies of national law by means of standard contracts and
21 December 1992 (international trade usage in this trade that silence would amount to
acceptance), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/921221s1.html, accessed on 22 July
2015.
5 Geneva Pharmaceuticals (industry custom that order can be for commercial quantities).
6 ICCArbitration case no 8324 of 1995 (Magnesium case) (international trade usage in this
industry that provisional price can be revised after conclusion), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/958324i1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015; District Court Hamburg
(Textiles case), Germany 26 September 1990 (international trade usage that date of payment
could be postponed until the date when the bill of exchange was due), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/900926g1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015.
7 Juzgado Nacional de Primera Instancia en lo Comerical No 10 (Argentina 23 October
1991), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=184, accessed on 28 July 2015;
Juzgado Nacional de Primera Instancia en lo Comerical No 10 (Argentina 6 October 1994),
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=178, accessed on 28 July 2015 (rate of
interest); Landgericht Bamberg (Plants case), Germany 23 October 2006, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061023g1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015; CLOUT case no
590 (Landgericht Saarbrücken, Germany 1 June 2004).
8 Some scholars hold that its roots go back to the ius gentium of the Romans. For a
historical analysis of its development, see Wethmar-Lemmer ‘The development of the
modern lex mercatoria: A historical perspective’ (2005) 11 Fundamina 183; Snyman-Van
Deventer ‘Die nuwe lex mercatoria’ (2011) 22(2) Stellenbosch LR 247; Hatzimihail ‘Genealo-
gies of lex mercatoria’ (studies in memoriam of Professor Antapasis, 2013) 321, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2410223, accessed on 22 July 2015.
9 Snyman-Van Deventer (2011) 22(2) Stellenbosch LR 247 at 253–255; Hatzimihail (2013)
at 322; DiMatteo ‘Soft law and the principle of fair and equitable decision making in
international contract arbitration’ 2013 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1 at 6.
10 Dalhuisen Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade
Law Vol 1 ‘Introduction — the new lex mercatoria and its sources’ (Hart 2010) 156–157;
Goode ‘Usage and its reception in transnational commercial law’ (1997) 46(1) International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 8. These instances should be distinguished from those
that meet the requirements of international customary law.
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general conditions of trade based on trade custom and usage.11 Today,
the self-regulatory character of contractual trade usage continues to exist
in the form of standard contracts formulated by private merchant and
trade associations in highly organised branches of international trade,
for instance in the commodity trade in wool, cocoa, grain and feed, fur,
jute, rubber, sugar and many more.12 International business organisa-
tions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, furthermore
provide standardised transnational formulations of international con-
tractual trade usage.13 Even regional economic communities negotiate
standard forms of contract for traders from their member countries to
facilitate the sale of certain types of goods.14
National laws normally sanction the use of trade usage on the basis of
the parties’ assumed or constructive knowledge of such usage, on
condition that certain requirements are met. South African law, for
example, will imply usage as a term of the contract if such usage is
‘universally and uniformly observed within the particular trade con-
cerned, long-established, notorious, reasonable and certain, and does
not conﬂict with positive law (in the sense of endeavouring to alter a rule
of law which the parties could not alter by their agreement) or with the
clear provisions of the contract’.15 Thus, trade usage is used as an
11 Private merchant associations such as the Association of Corn Merchants of Hamburg
(1868), also known as the Hamburg Bourse of Corn Traders; the Bremen Cotton Exchange
(1872); the Silk Association of America (1873) and the London Corn Trade Association
(1877) undertook these uniﬁcation initiatives. See Cutler Private Power and Global Authority:
Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Economy (Cambridge University Press
2003) 208.
12 Of the most well-known examples in international commodity trade are the London
Commodity Merchants, the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) and the Federation
of Oils, Seeds and Fats Association (FOSFA). On the generation of uniform commercial
norms and the exclusion of uniform sales laws such as the CISG in favour of English law, see,
in general, Linarelli ‘The economics of uniform laws and uniform lawmaking’ (2003) 48
Wayne LR 1387 at 1439–1442.
13 For example, the Incoterms rules and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documen-
tary Credits (UCP).
14 For example, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which negotiated
standard forms of contracts for traders from their member countries, such as ECE Form 188
(General Conditions for the Supply of Plant and Machinery for Export. Standard contracts
also exist for trade in cereals, citrus fruit and sawn softwood. The ECEGeneral Conditions for
Potatoes, for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables and for Dry and Dried Fruit contain different trade
terms which parties should select from; the same applies for the ECE Contracts for the Sale of
Cereals where separate forms are used for different trade terms.
15 Golden Cape Fruits (Pty) Ltd v Fotoplate (Pty) Ltd 1973 (2) SA 642 (C) at 645G. See also
Crook v Pedersen Ltd 1927 WLD 62 at 71; ABSA Bank Ltd v Blumberg and Wilkinson 1995 (4)
SA 403 (W) at 409I;MVDelta PeaceMaree NO v Registrar, Durban and Coast Local Division of
the High Court & others 2001 (4) SA 110 (D); Tolgaz Southern Africa v Solgas (Pty) Ltd &
another; Easigas (Pty) Ltd v Solgas (Pty) Ltd & another 2009 (4) SA 37 (W) at 45H–I, 46F–H.
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interpretative tool or to ﬁll contractual gaps.16 International instru-
ments regulating international commerce, such as the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) or
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(UNIDROIT Principles), also recognise the binding effect of agreed
usages and practices established between contractual parties on the basis
of party autonomy and freedom of contract.17 By virtue of art 7(2) of the
CISG, trade usage can be used to ﬁll so-called ‘internal gaps’18 and, thus,
give meaning to and develop the provisions of the convention in
accordance with commercial practices. Trade usage can even trump the
provisions of the CISG, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.19
Commentators and courts have viewed trade usage as a general principle
on which the convention is based.20 Scholars and arbitrators have
also, on occasion, identiﬁed international trade conventions and
16 Gillette ‘Harmony and stasis in trade usage for international sales’ (1999) 39 Virginia
Journal of International Law 707 at 707–708. Whether trade usage merely acts as an implied
contractual term or whether it may also ﬁnd application as independent and autonomous law
is not entirely clear as differing opinions exist in this regard. Dalhuisen (Hart 2010) at 155, n
326 points out that, because of its ‘ﬂuid nature’, custom can over time move from a
contractual implied term to objective law. As for SA law, Kerr The Principles of The Law of
Contract 6 ed (Butterworths 2002) 380–382 states that once the requirements for usage are
met, usage operates as a residual term independent of party agreement, while Christie &
Bradﬁeld Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa 6 ed (LexisNexis 2011) 168–173 holds
the opinion that, evenwhere one party is unaware of the usage, its operationwill be based on a
presumed intention. According to Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 4 ed (Juta
2012) 241–242, 246, trade usage may function as a naturale of the contract and, thus, a term
implied by law. Such usage applies independent of whether the parties are aware of the usage
or not. However, where knowledge is required for its operation, it may only apply as a tacit
term. Policy considerations would ultimately determine when usages are to operate as terms
implied by law and when as tacit terms. See also Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal
Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) at 531–532; Bredenkamp & others v Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) at 473 for the difference between tacit terms
and terms implied by law. In Coutts v Jacobs 1927 EDL 120, the court supported the
autonomous nature of trade usage and the plaintiff was held bound to a usage of which he had
no knowledge. This aspect is, however, beyond the scope of this article and will therefore not
be addressed in any detail.
17 Arts 8(3) and 9 CISG; art 1.9 UNIDROIT Principles.
18 These are terms which are in need of clariﬁcation, or issues which, in the words of art
7(2), are ‘governed but not settled’ by the convention.
19 Art 9(2) CISG.
20 Andersen ‘General principles of the CISG — generally impenetrable?’ in Andersen &
Schroeter (eds) Sharing International Commercial Law across National Boundaries: Festschrift
for Albert H Kritzer on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday (Wildy, Simmonds andHill 2008)
29; Ferrari ‘Uniform interpretation of the 1980 uniform sales law’ (1994–1995) 24 Georgia
Journal of International and Comparative Law 183 at 223; Tribunale di Padova (Agricultural
products case), Italy 25 February 2004, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
040225i3.html, accessed on 22 July 2015; Rechtbank Koophandel Ieper (Cooling installations
case), Belgium 29 January 2001, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010129b1.html,
accessed on 28 July 2015; UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (2012) art 7.
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codiﬁcations, such as the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles, as
sources of international trade usage.21 Moreover, courts have ruled that
Incoterms® constitute international trade usage as envisaged by art 9(2)
of the CISG.22
Trade usage has acquired its normative quality from the fact that it
comprises consistent and uniform practices which are recognised and
observed across geographical borders by traders in that trade.23 These
practices are applied with such regularity over a period of time that it is
assumed that everyone active in that trade would know them.24 Where
practices are widely and regularly followed in international trade they
are presumed to be economically efﬁcient as inefﬁcient practices would
not have stood the test of time.25 Furthermore, these practices would be
of such a nature that most people involved in that trade would want to
follow them.26 Moreover, usages do not constitute practices which are
simply followed out of habit but are practices which parties feel bound to
follow even if the only sanction for non-observance would be reputa-
tional in nature.27 At the same time, it is assumed that the content of
such practices is certain and clear, otherwise they would not have
21 DiMatteo 2013 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1 at 27, 34; Cuniberti ‘Three
theories of lex mercatoria’ (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 381–383,
394; Wasserstein Fassberg ‘Lex mercatoria — hoist with its own petard?’ (2004) 5 Chicago
Journal of International Law 67 at 70–71. See also Goode (1997) 46(1) International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 3 who refers to, but also criticises, this notion.
22 Higher Cantonal Court du Valais (Fiberglass composite materials case), Switzerland 28
January 2009, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090128s1.html, accessed on 22
July 2015; Marc Rich & Co v Iritechna SpA Appellate Court Geneva, Italy 24 March 1995,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950324i3.html, accessed on 22 July 2015; St Paul
Guardian Insurance Co vNeuromedMedical Systems& Support 2002WL465312 (SDNY2002)
US Federal District Court, New York 26 March 2002, CLOUT case no 447, available at
http:/cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020326u1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015; China North
Chemical Industries Corporation v Beston Chemical CorporationWL 295396 (SD Tex 2006) US
Federal District Court, Texas 7 February 2006, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
060207u1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015; BP Oil International v Empresa Estatal Petroleos de
Ecuador 332 F3d 333 (5th Cir 2003) 338, 200 ALR Fed 771 Federal Appellate Court (5th
Circuit) United States 11 June 2003, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
030611u1.html, accessed on 22 July 2015.
23 Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 714; DiMatteo 2013 The
Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1 at 8.
24 Gillette (1999) 39Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 708, 715, 721.
25 Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 715–716; Dalhuisen
‘Custom and its revival in transnational private law’ (2008) 18Duke Journal of Comparative &
International Law 339 at 370.
26 Gillette (1999) 39Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 713–714.
27 Goode (1997) 46(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 8–9, Gillette
(1999) 39Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 720; DiMatteo 2013The Chinese Journal
of Comparative Law 1 at 8.
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become widely established.28Owing to its uniform nature, trade usage is
observed across geographical borders and, thus, fulﬁls a harmonisation
function, which brings a reduction in transaction costs.29 Another
advantage of trade usage is that it is generated within a particular trade
or industry and, because of its dynamic nature, evolves in line with
developments in that trade. To that extent, trade usage is better suited to
the needs of the trade and to commerce in general than state-formulated
law.30
This article seeks to evaluate the traditional rationale for the self-
regulatory role of trade usage in present-day international sales law31 in
order to determine its overall efﬁciency in the modern commercial
context. For one, the existence of the lex mercatoria as the historic basis
for the normative character of trade usage is continuously debated.
Many a scholar has contributed to the discourse, either in favour or
against; so much so that it is questioned whether an autonomous legal
system in the form of the medieval law merchant ever existed.32
Furthermore, studies conducted on the role of trade usage in the United
States concluded that the traditional assumptions that unwritten trade
usages are widely known in the trade, that courts can either take judicial
notice of such usages or easily identify and determine their content, and
that they represent what most people would want, are without any real
substance. Moreover, it was found that business and trade associations
no longer resort to trade usage on the same scale as before but rather
28 See Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 724 on the beneﬁts of
trade usage if compared to explicit contract clauses.
29 Gillette (1999) 39Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 715–716; Cuniberti (2014)
52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 384; Mak ‘According to custom ... ? The role
of ‘‘trade usage’’ in the proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL)’ (Legal Studies
Research Paper Series No 02/2014, Tilburg Law School, 2014) 8–11, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2364427, accessed on 22 July 2015. See, however, the discussion under
III(c) on the interpretational challenges connected to trade usage.
30 Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 708; DiMatteo 2013 The
Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1 at 8.
31 Although this article focuses on international sales law, it should be noted that trade
usage plays a signiﬁcant role in all areas of commercial law and that the issues discussed here
will equally apply to those areas of the law. See, in general, Dalhuisen (Hart 2010) at 159–161.
32 Michaels ‘The true lex mercatoria: Law beyond the state’ (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies 447 at 448–54; Snyman-VanDeventer (2011) 22(2) Stellenbosch LR 247 at
256, 261; Fassberg (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 67 at 68–69; Donohue
‘Medieval and early modern lex mercatoria: An attempt at the probatio diabolica’ (2004) 5
Chicago Journal of International Law 21; Kadens ‘The myth of the customary law merchant’
(2012) 90 Texas LR 1153.
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elect to make use of written contracts, which are to be interpreted in a
formalistic manner.33
The question that this article seeks to answer is whether, in modern
times, trade usage still constitutes efﬁcient law created by merchants for
merchants. Because empirical studies on the use of trade usages in
practical contexts are generally scarce,34 it would be prudent to take note
of the aforementioned study, even though it was conducted in the
context of national law, namely the American Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). Scholars regularly compare the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code with those of the CISG as they both provide a
uniform sales law and, furthermore, display strong similarities in
content.35Thus, criticisms directed towards the assumptions in theUCC
could be equally relevant for the international context. Furthermore,
even though this contribution focuses on international contracts of sale,
domestic law will often apply as the applicable law of the contract, either
as an express or tacit choice of law or as the assigned proper law of the
contract. In some instances, these rules will point towards the applica-
tion of South African law; hence, the need to refer to South African
scholars’ criticisms of the traditional requirements for trade usage as
33 National and international law subscribe to the use of trade usage as an interpretative
tool to interpret the terms of a contract or to ﬁll contractual gaps. Standard contracts are often
the product of usages of the trade, and where trade organisations have internal structures
which adjudicate these matters, they are ideally suited to apply usages of the trade in the
interpretation of their contracts. However, Bernstein’s research found that contextual
interpretation is not so popular with trade organisations and bigger business due to the
uncertainties that surround usage, but that they prefer literal interpretation where no resort is
made to usage to ensure greater contractual certainty. It is her opinion that interpretative
error costsmight not justify the application of trade usage in these contexts. See, in this regard,
Bernstein ‘Merchant law in a modern economy’ (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics Working Paper No 639, University of Chicago, 2013) 2–3, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2242490, accessed on 22 July 2015; Bernstein ‘Custom in the courts’
(2015) 110Northwestern University LR 63 at 67; Bernstein ‘Merchant law in amerchant court:
Rethinking the code’s search for immanent business norms’ (1996) 144 University of
Pennsylvania LR 1765 at 1769–1770.
34 Cuniberti ‘The merchant who would not be king — unreasoned fears about private
lawmaking’ (Law Working Paper No 2014–07, University of Luxembourg, 2012) 6, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2504439, accessed on 22 July 2015; Bernstein (2013) at 3. See also
Cuniberti (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 396–397 on the lack of
empirical data available as a result of the conﬁdentiality with which international commercial
arbitration awards are treated. Apart from Bernstein’s studies, which were restricted to
speciﬁc trades, a study by Schmitthoff International Trade Usages (ICC 1987) is to date one of
the most comprehensive studies on trade usage in the international context as it covered a
wide range of legal jurisdictions and international instruments of harmonisation.
35 Bernstein (2013) at 1. See, for example, Saunders & Rymsza ‘Contract formation and
performance under the UCC and CISG: A comparative case study’ (2015) 32(1) Journal of
Legal Studies Education 1; DiMatteo ‘Global challenge of international sales law’ in DiMatteo
(ed) International Sales Law: A Global Challenge (Cambridge University Press 2014) 4–5.
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applied by the courts in light of developments in technology, documen-
tation, as well as methods of communication and transportation. At the
same time, it should be noted that the absence of uniform usages in the
domestic trades under investigation in the American study is compa-
rable to the international position regarding some of the traditional
trade terms.36 For that reason, this article willmake constant reference to
the position under trade terms and compare that to the ﬁndings of
Bernstein’s American study in order to come to an own conclusion on
the efﬁciency of trade usage in present-day international sales law.
The article will commence with a brief discussion on the origins of the
self-regulatory nature of mercantile custom as found in the lex mercato-
ria. This will be followed by a critical discussion of the traditional
assumptions on which trade usage is based and how these assumptions
apply to the current trade context in order to reach a conclusion on
whether trade usage is still lawmade by merchants for merchants.
II HISTORICAL ROOTS: THE LEX MERCATORIA
The historical basis for the normative function of unwritten trade usage
is usually sought in the lex mercatoria, a private system of law based on
commercial custom and adjudicated by specialised tribunals which was
introduced in medieval times to deal with international ﬁnance and
tradematters.37However, over the years, the concept and understanding
of the law merchant have changed considerably. Little agreement exists
on whether it existed at all, and in which form it continues to exist in
present-day international trade, if at all.38 Due to the constraints of this
article, it will be impossible to deal with these aspects in any detail. Thus,
36 It is very difﬁcult to identify consistent usage or customs in so far as the traditional
maritime terms, FOB and CIF terms are concerned. See, for example, Schmitthoff (ICC 1987)
at para 37 on the differences in the trade usages surrounding the FOB term. The understand-
ing of the term depends on the trade, the port or the country where it is used. Trade terms
reﬂect merchant practices, which developed in the context of the delivery of goods, the repeat
use of which gave rise to standard forms of contract. Trade terms are also known as sales
terms, delivery terms or commercial terms. Differences in the meaning of trade terms
necessitated the standardisation of the respective parties’ obligations. The ICC Incoterms are
today the most well-known codiﬁcations of international trade terms. The latest revision,
Incoterms 2010, recognises the ﬂexibility of the FOB rule by signiﬁcantly changing the
wording of the term. See Lorenzon C.I.F. and F.O.B. Contracts 5 ed (Sweet & Maxwell 2012)
para 9–010.
37 Bainbridge ‘Trade usages in international sales of goods: An analysis of the 1964 and 1980
sales conventions’ (1984) 24 Virginia Journal of International Law 619 at 624–625; Wethmar-
Lemmer (2005) 11 Fundamina 183; Bernstein (2013) at 4.
38 Hatzimihail (2013) at 311; Snyman-Van Deventer (2011) 22(2) Stellenbosch LR 247 at
260 et seq.
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these issues will only be discussed in broad terms in so far as they are
relevant to the topic under discussion.
In essence, the literature identiﬁes three stages in the development of
the law merchant, namely a relatively autonomous set of rules, the
so-called ancient lex mercatoria, followed by the incorporation if these
transnational customs into the national laws of Europe, and, subse-
quently, the new law merchant of the twentieth century.39 Essentially,
there are two approaches to the new lawmerchant, namely the positivist
approach and the autonomist approach.40 The former holds that the
new law merchant is dependent on recognition by the state or party
agreement. International legislation, such as conventions and model
laws which are introduced into national law through ratiﬁcation or
adoption, and international commercial custom, such as standard form
contracts, general conditions of trade or formulations by international
business organisations, for example, those of the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC), provide the sources of the new lawmerchant.41The
autonomous approach, on the other hand, suggests that the law
merchant is an a-national, self-generating system of soft law, mostly
applied by arbitral tribunals.42
Opinions on the existence of an a-national law differ from total
dismissal to unconditional support.Whether the lawmerchant can exist
as an autonomous set of rules regulating commercial exchange is a
question that is much debated, and equally as much has been written on
it.43 Predominantly, the question concerns a theoretical debate on
whether law can exist outside the conﬁnes of the state,44 which is
39 Bainbridge (1984) 24 Virginia Journal of International Law 619 at 624; Snyman-Van
Deventer (2011) 22(2) Stellenbosch LR 247 at 251–259. In general on the evolution of the law
merchant, see also Hatzimihail (2013); Wethmar-Lemmer (2005) 11 Fundamina 183;
Schmitthoff (ICC 1987) paras 64–74; Michaels (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies 447 at 453–460.
40 See Hatzimihail (2013) at 318–337 for a comparative discussion of the positivist
approach as formulated by Schmitthoff and the autonomist approach as developed by
Goldman.
41 See Schmitthoff ‘The Uniﬁcation of the Law of International Trade’ in Cheng (ed) Clive
M. Schmitthoff’s Select Essays on International Trade Law (Martinus Nijhoff/Graham &
Trotman 1988) at 171–172; Schmitthoff (ICC 1987) paras 64–74; Maniruzzaman ‘The lex
mercatoria and international contracts: A challenge for international commercial arbitra-
tion?’ (1999) 14(3) American University International LR 657 at 671–672.
42 See Berman & Kaufmann ‘The law of international commercial transactions (lex
mercatoria)’ (1978) 19Harvard International LJ 221 at 272–277.
43 Snyman-Van Deventer (2011) 22(2) Stellenbosch LR 247 at 260–268; Hatzimihail (2013)
at 311; Wethmar-Lemmer (2005) 11 Fundamina 183 at 183; Michaels (2007) 14 Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies 447 at 448–449.
44 See, in general, Michaels (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447 for a
discussion of this controversial debate.
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essentially beyond the scope of this article. Research has cast doubt on
whether a truly autonomous ancient law merchant ever existed in the
Middle Ages.45 And if it did exist, it is equally controversial whether it
managed to survive as autonomous law after trade usage was absorbed
into national law in the nineteenth century and also codiﬁed in various
forms in an effort to make it more accessible.46
Those opposed to the autonomous nature of the law merchant,
furthermore, point out that the lex mercatoria never functioned as a
system of substantive law but only as procedural law.47 Moreover, it is
said that there is no real historical basis for a customary law of
international sales but that custom covered very speciﬁc contexts, such
as those of bills of exchange, insurance, maritime shipping, surety and
agency.48 The notion that the lex mercatoria was purely customary in
nature and that it constituted transnational law is also refuted by the fact
that these customs were geographically limited to application within a
conﬁned network of repeat players.49 Another view is that the lex
mercatoria was ‘a mixture of ofﬁcial laws and established mercantile
customs and institutions, of ofﬁcial courts and quasi-private local
tribunals’50 and, thus, never a true autonomous law. Furthermore, it is
questioned whether the new law merchant can operate as an indepen-
dent legal system enforced through international arbitration in light of
the relative inaccessibility of arbitral awards, the lack of a precedent
system and uncertainty on the enforceability of such awards.51
Although its existence as a separate legal order might be in dispute, it
cannot, however, be denied that merchants continue to rely on trade
usage to regulate their commercial relationships and that national and
international law still recognise this role. It is therefore necessary to
investigate the reasons for this phenomenon in more detail.
45 Donohue (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 21; Kadens (2012) 90 Texas LR
1153; Michaels (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447 at 448–454; Hatzimihail
(2013) at 313; Bernstein (2013) at 4, 10; Snyman-Van Deventer (2011) 22(2) Stellenbosch LR
247 at 256.
46 Fassberg (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 67.
47 Fassberg (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 67 at 68.
48 Bernstein (2013) at 4; Kadens (2012) 90 Texas LR 1153 at 1169; Kadens ‘The medieval
law merchant: The tyranny of a construct’ Journal of Legal Analysis at 6, available at
http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/06/25/jla.lav004.full, accessed on 29 June
2015.
49 Bernstein (2013) 4; Kadens (2012) 90 Texas LR 1153 at 1177.
50 Michaels (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447 at 454.
51 Michaels (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447 at 456; Snyman-Van
Deventer (2011) 22(2) Stellenbosch LR 247 at 261–262.
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III RATIONALE FOR THE NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE USAGE
The self-regulating nature of trade usage is essentially based on the
premise that usage originates in the trade as practices that are certain and
that are consistently and regularly followed over a period of time by
those engaged in that trade who then consider these practices as binding
on them. Thus, usage functions as rules made by merchants for the use
of merchants.52 As they represent the most optimal practices of the
trade, usages are geared to the needs of merchants and represent what
most traders would want; thus, they are widely known and regularly
observed in the trade concerned. Trade usages, furthermore, save
transaction costs as parties do not have to negotiate their content and
their meaning transcends geographical and legal boundaries.
But is this traditional rationale beyond reproach and does it still apply to
the trade environment of the twenty-ﬁrst century? In what follows, the
assumptions on which the rationale is based will be analysed.
(a) Trade usage represents the most optimal practice and is
geared to the needs of merchants
It is believed that usage facilitates economic and commercial exchange as
it is created bymerchants for the use of merchants.While uniform law is
often a compromise between different legal systems and offers abstract
rules that are potentially suitable to a myriad of situations, trade usage
cuts across national boundaries and differences in legal philosophies,
political and other socio-economic structures, and speaks to the needs of
merchants and the trade per se. Thus, trade usage adapts the rules of law
to the way that business is actually carried on.53
Economically efﬁcient practices are generated through an evolution-
ary process and their origins are often found in the individual relation-
ship of two contractual parties.54 As merchants gravitate towards the
most optimal practices, an efﬁcient trade practice that exists between
two parties may over time be taken over by other merchants active in
that trade.55 Once the practice is regularised as a trade usage, everyone
52 Dalhuisen (Hart 2010) at 159; DiMatteo 2013 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1
at 8.
53 Bernstein (2013) 1; DiMatteo 2013 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1 at 11.
54 Gillette ‘The law merchant in the modern age: Institutional design and international
usages under the CISG’ (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 160.
55 Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 708, 721; Dalhuisen (Hart
2010) at 159; Dalhuisen (2008) 18 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 339 at
370.
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active in that trade is expected to know and follow it. When trade
associations observe how transactions of a relatively similar nature are
conducted on a repeat basis over long periods of time, they codify these
customs into written trade rules and industry-speciﬁc standard terms
and conditions.56
However, studies conducted on the evolution of codiﬁed trade usage
in certain domestic trades in the United States of America, such as the
trade in grain, hay, textiles and silk, have challenged these traditional
assumptions, so much so that it is questioned whether the rules of trade
associations always represent actual customs and usages which have
developed in the trade.57 These studies have revealed that at the time the
trade associations under investigation formulated their industry rules
there was little agreement on how common aspects of those trades were
conducted or on the content of usages and the meaning of terms
typically used in those trades. Trade practices were so divergent that they
were incapable of being codiﬁed. Thus, the industry rules in those trades
rarely represent actual practice.58 Moreover, where it was impossible to
identify a single uniform custom, it resulted in different rules being
formulated for different situations.59 Initiatives to codify were mostly
driven by those groups which exerted the most power or inﬂuence. The
ultimate goal these groups pursued was to promote trade in general and
not so much to codify existing customs of the trade. The conclusion is
that trade associations largely failed to harmonise existing practices and
usages, but in an effort to ensure certainty, uniformity and to avoid
misunderstandings, they generated rules (or usages) of their own.
Therefore, efforts to codify existing practices often gave way to standard-
ising usages in a quasi-legislative manner.60 As far as modern trade
industries are concerned, the study concluded that it was equally
difﬁcult to ﬁnd evidence of uniform trade usages within a fairly closed
network of repeat players in the Texas cattle feed industry.61
These ﬁndings have not been received without objection and some
scholars regard them as highly controversial and without substance.62
56 Bernstein (1996) 144University of Pennsylvania LR 1765 at 1805–1806.
57 Bernstein (2013).
58 Bernstein (2013) 5–6.
59 Bernstein (2013) 6. That is today still the case under GAFTA and FOSFA where different
FOB terms are available.
60 Bernstein (2013) 6.
61 Bernstein (2013) 8–10. See also Fassberg (2004) 5Chicago Journal of International Law 67
at 79, who argues that all commercial custom she has come across is covered by rules of
national law and, thus, is not unique at all.
62 Bernstein (2013) 7–8. Some of the criticisms are that the studies are limited to certain
trades and, therefore, not necessarily representative of business in general, and that the time
(2016) 28 SAMERC LJ96
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
Although these objections are not to be disregarded, the conclusions of
the American study are also not to be rejected categorically as many of
them are plausible, especially when considered in the context of
present-day international trade. Trade associations operate in a com-
pletely different setting from that of the nineteenth century, which was
characterised by guilds and other small merchant associations. In the
twenty-ﬁrst century, business transactions are no longer exclusively
conducted within the closed environment of a particular trade but
increasingly take place via a chain of production and distribution links.63
In thismore complex setting, it would be very difﬁcult, if not impossible,
to regulate transactions on the basis of unwritten usages and customs.
Moreover, in those trades where organised trade associations exist and
practices are codiﬁed, the process of codiﬁcation differs from that used
in the past. Trade associations no longer consist exclusively ofmerchants
who codify informal and unwritten trade practices which were devel-
oped bymerchants for the use ofmerchants. Instead, business practice is
now formulated by people with business degrees or lawyers according to
their perception of best practices.64 Some commentators, therefore,
argue that in our day and age, commercial custom seldom develops
spontaneously, but that business associations draft standard terms
which over time may develop into custom.65 As Goode remarks in the
context of international trade conventions, what harmonisation projects
‘seek to achieve is best solutions to typical problems’ and, thus, they will
reﬂect existing practices but in the process also modify some of these
practices.66 That would be equally true of standard form contracts.
Because business practice is no longer formulated exclusively by
merchants as a reﬂection of what most traders would want, the
traditional assumptions of efﬁciency are being challenged. What is
formulated as the standard or norm might even be inﬂuenced by lobby
groups and multinational corporations to protect their own interests
and no longer aimed at addressing the needs of merchants and the trade
period covered by the studies might not be long enough to warrant any conclusions on the
existence of usage. See, for example, Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law
707 at n 10.
63 Bernstein (2013) 16, 22; De Ly ‘Sources of international sales law: An eclectic model’
(2005–2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 1 at 5.
64 Fassberg (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 67 at 80–81; Basedow ‘The state’s
private law and the economy — commercial law as an amalgam of public and private
rule-making’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 703 at 708.
65 Basedow ibid at 708–9. See alsoDalhuisen (Hart 2010) at 160. For a contrary opinion, see
Fassberg (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 67 at 78–79.
66 Goode (1997) 46(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 19.
TRADEUSAGE: STILL LAWMADE BYMERCHANTS FORMERCHANTS? 97
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
per se.67 Moreover, codiﬁcations and statements of international prin-
ciples are predominantly formulated by lawyers and academics.68
On an international level, a parallel for the ﬁndings of Bernstein’s
study can be found in the ICC’s treatment of international trade terms.
By means of the Incoterms rules, the ICC standardise mercantile
customs and practices in the context of the delivery of goods. These rules
are the product of consultation with business organisations and local
chambers of commerce. However, not all of the rules represent a
codiﬁcation of existing mercantile customs. The modern Incoterms
rules, namely FCA, CPT, CIP and the D-terms (DAT, DAP and DDP),
are often perceived as mere formulations of the ICC, created to cater for
changing international transportation practices.69
Although the formulation of standardised practices reduces transac-
tion costs by promoting uniformity and legal certainty, whether it
constitutes best or optimal practice is another question. The answer to
that is to a large extent dependent on the benchmark against which
efﬁcient practices are measured. Traditionally, consistent practices
which had stood the test of time and were widely and regularly followed
by the majority in that trade would be considered efﬁcient. In the
modern context, the requirement that usage should be long established
is not feasible any longer due to the globalised nature of international
trade, the way that it is regulated and the pace against which technology
develops. This has led to this requirement being increasingly watered
down.
South African law, for instance, no longer requires that the usage
should have existed for a long time. If all the other requirements aremet,
recent origin of a trade usage will not per se prevent it from having
binding effect.70 This approach was already accepted by Kotze CJ in
African Mining and Financial Association v De Catelin and Muller.71
According to Kerr, if the parties to a contract expressly or impliedly
(tacitly) incorporated a trade usage or custom into their contract, it is
not a requirement that the usage must have existed for a period of time.
However, if the usage is implied by law, ‘sufﬁcient time must have
67 Gillette (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 160–161; Gillette (1999) 39
Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 738. This can give rise to monopolies or cartels
that can impose inefﬁcient practices.
68 Fassberg (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 67 at 80–81.
69 De Ly International Business Law and LexMercatoria (Emerald 1992) 174–175; Ramberg
‘Incoterms® 2010’ (2011) 29 Penn State International LR 415 at 422. See Dalhuisen (Hart
2010) at 160–161 who is of the opinion that trade organisations and associations, such as the
ICC, may help in keeping these rules dynamic.
70 Christie & Bradﬁeld (LexisNexis 2011) at 170–171.
71 (1897) 4 OR 334 at 348.
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elapsed to entitle a court to ﬁnd that in the circumstances of the
particular case the party who is ignorant of the usage or custom had
every opportunity of knowing of it and ought to have known of it’.72
Trade usage is in a constant process of development, which makes it
increasingly difﬁcult to meet the traditional requirement that the usage
should be long established. The efﬁciency of usage is, therefore, not so
much found in the fact that it withstood the test of time, but in that the
parties to the contract ought to have known of its existence. Here time
can have a direct bearing on the notoriety of such usage.73 The Appellate
Court in Van Breda & others v Jacobs & others74 held that Roman Dutch
law differed from English law in so far as there is no requirement that
custommust have existed for time immemorial and that it would sufﬁce
that it is simply old. Roman Dutch authorities, furthermore, did not
prescribe how long the usage should have existed, but simply left the
question to the discretion of the judge.75 It would, therefore, seem that
the other requirements, namely that the usage must be certain, reason-
able, notorious as well as universally and uniformly observed within the
particular trade concerned, will be decisive and that the time period the
practice existed will only have effect to the extent that it inﬂuences the
other requirements.76 Van Niekerk ﬁnds the solution not to be in ‘a
stiffening of the duration requirement but rather [in] a stricter applica-
tion of the reasonableness test’.77
It should, however, not automatically be assumed that all customs
which have stood the test of time reﬂect themost efﬁcient practice or, on
the other hand, that all rules generated by merchant associations and
international business organisations are inefﬁcient. Trade practice is by
its nature dynamic and, therefore, constantly evolving. Usage is more
susceptible to change than domestic laws and international conventions,
which have to be revised through time-consuming legislative processes.
72 Kerr (Butterworths 2002) at 381.
73 Christie & Bradﬁeld (LexisNexis 2011) at 171.
74 1921 AD 330. In Catering Equipment Centre v Friesland Hotel 1967 (4) SA 336 (O) at 339
the court held that RomanDutch lawmade no difference between custom and trade usage. In
SA law, these two terms are for all practical purposes used interchangeably.
75 Schorer Aanteekeningen ad Grotium 1.2.21 n 6; Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek
1.1.7.
76 See Tropic Plastic and Packaging Industry v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1969 (4) SA 108 (D)
which places the emphasis on the other requirements. For a discussion on the time
requirement, see in general Du Toit ‘Reﬂections on the South African Code of Banking
Practice’ 2014 TSAR 568 at 571–572; Hugo ‘The legal nature of the uniform customs and
practice for documentary credits: Lex mercatoria, custom, or contract?’ (1994) 6 SA Merc LJ
143 at 162–64.
77 Van Niekerk ‘Some thoughts on custom as a formative source of South African law’
(1968) 85 SALJ 279 at 285.
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Usage, furthermore, is more efﬁcient because it is aimed at a speciﬁc
trade, as opposed to default rules of lawwhich are formulated to apply to
a wide range of transactions.78 The converse may also be true, though.
The ability to adapt to changes in mercantile practice has its advantages
but also a downside. Trade usage is dependent on consistent and certain
practices which are regularly observed over a period of time by those
engaged in the trade and is therefore indirectly challenged by the
concept of globalisation, which is mostly spurred by rapidly changing
technology. It takes some time for a practice tomeet the requirements of
certainty and uniform observance in the trade and by that time, a new
and more efﬁcient practice might have developed already. Moreover, to
establish a new usage might be difﬁcult where an old, albeit less efﬁcient,
practice is still used on a regular basis. Often a practice remains in force
simply because traders are better acquainted with it compared to one
they do not know. Fear of transaction costs in the form of network and
learning effects is one of themain reasons for practices becoming ‘locked
in’.79 This is especially so where traders act in closed circles, such as in
groups or networks. If some of the traders in that group would
informally start to follow a new and more effective practice, it would
mean that the group as a whole or the representative body or association
regulating that trade has to be convinced of the superiority of this
practice. Even after having been convinced of its efﬁciency, a network
may still be reluctant to follow a newpractice due to the transaction costs
it will have to incur in educating itsmembers on its use. This could result
in a well-known and frequently-used practice remaining in force long
after a new and more efﬁcient practice has been introduced to the
market.80
The continued use of the FOB and CIF trade terms in contexts where
they no longer represent optimal trade usage provides an example of
locked-in practices. FOB, the oldest trade term known to international
trade, is still one of the most frequently used trade terms worldwide.81
Since its inception in the early nineteenth century,82 transportation
78 Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 708; Bernstein (2013) at 1.
79 Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 712; Gillette (2004) 5
Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 161.
80 According to Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 726 ‘[w]hat
binds the parties to a custom is not the alleged superiority of the practice, but the expectations
that others will follow it’.
81 Grifﬁn Day & Griffin: The Law of International Trade 3 ed (Butterworths LexisNexis
2003) 65.
82 Großman-Doerth Überseekauf I 44; Renck ‘Der Einﬂuß der INCOTERMS auf das
UN-Kaufrecht: EineUntersuchung zu den rechtlichenWirkungen der INCOTERMS 1990 im
Recht des internationalen Warenkaufts’ (published LLM thesis, Hamburg University, 1995)
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practices have developed in reaction to the container revolution and the
advent of multimodal transport. The practice that risk passes when the
goods cross the ship’s rail originated in times when the seller was present
when his goods were placed on board the vessel; in many cases he even
chartered the ship and accompanied the cargo. Today the seller relin-
quishes all control over the goods when they are delivered to the port or
container terminal, which might be days or weeks before the ship
departs or is even loaded. Notwithstanding, under the traditional trade
terms, the seller remains responsible for the risk in the goods until they
are delivered on board the ship. This practice is no longer in line with
modern international policy considerations underlying the passing of
risk, which entail that delivery should take place, and, consequently, the
risk of loss of and damage to the goods should transfer to the buyer when
the goods are handed to the carrier or any entity in the transportation
link which is controlled by the carrier, such as a container terminal or a
freight forwarder.83 As a result, trade practices connected to the delivery
of goods started to change. The ICC, as the standardising authority, took
the initiative to formulate the FCA and CPT Incoterms rules in line with
these considerations and practices. However, despite the availability of
rules that resemble more efﬁcient trade practices, manufactured or
containerised goods are still being sold on the basis of the traditional
FOB and CIF terms, even though they are no longer the optimal
practices in these types of trade. In many instances, the use of locked-in
practices can be attributed to a lack of knowledge or simply because old
habits die hard. In others, however, the main reason for the continued
use of the old terms is the costs of learning effects. In 2010, both the FOB
and CIF Incoterms rules were also revised. The revised rules display a
new, critical point for the passing of risk and costs in line with current
delivery practices. They now do away with the ship’s rail as the dividing
point and stipulate that delivery takes place when the goods are placed
on board the vessel; costs and risks to follow. However, despite its
inherent arbitrary nature, the ship’s rail as the traditional dividing point
5. The ﬁrst English judicial pronouncement dealing with the FOB clause dates back to 1812.
See Wackerbarth v Masson (1812) 3 Camp 270; Craven v Ryder (1816) 6 Taunt 433; Ruck v
Hatfield (1822) 5B & Ald 632. The German High Court also dealt with the FOB term from
early on; see RGZ 106, 213. However, it is possible that the origins of these practices might go
back even earlier. In this regard, see Sassoon ‘The origin of FOB and CIF terms and the factors
inﬂuencing their choice’ 1967 Journal of Business Law 32 at 33; Ramberg ‘Incoterms in the era
of electronic data interchange’ (published public lecture at the Forum Internationale, Kluwer
1988) 5.
83 Enderlein &Maskow International Sales Law: UnitedNations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (Oceana 1992) 257–258.
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for FOB and CIF terms has the potential to become a locked-in practice
if traders continue to follow the traditional position.
The danger of lock-in can be countered by merchant associations and
international standardisation organisations, such as the ICC, which can
play a valuable role to disseminate information and provide support for
new practices.84 However, although one would expect codiﬁed trade
usage to reﬂect efﬁcient and current international trade practices, that is
not always the case. For example, until its revision in 1993, a rule of the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (the UCP)
stated that all documentary credits were deemed to be revocable unless
otherwise indicated. Users of theUCP consistently contracted out of this
rule, which meant that as it stood, the rule did not reﬂect the actual
practice of the mercantile community to issue irrevocable instruments.
The ship’s rail as the division point for risk and costs under the FOB and
CIF Incoterms provides another example of inefﬁcient practices. Despite
the fact that the inherent uncertainty of the rule and its potential for
creating disputes were pointed out in the case of Pyrene Co Ltd v Scindia
Navigation Co Ltd,85 and different practices were already in place in
different ports of the world, the ICC only revised this point in 2010. The
argument was that they could not ﬁnd evidence of a consistent practice
that deviates from the traditional position. That would require the
introduction of a number of variants, which would result in even more
uncertainty.86
(b) Widely known, regularly observed and what most people
would want
Where a practice in a particular trade has become harmonised to the
extent that it has developed into a trade usage or custom, it is no longer
necessary for contractual parties to assess the risks and predict the likely
outcomes for each situation and, thus, to negotiate and agree to each
term explicitly. This saves transaction costs.87 When a usage is widely
known and followed over a geographically large area, contractual parties
are expected to know and follow such usage, even where they do not
84 The ICC advises traders on the optimal use of each rule with reference to the type of
transportation method used and the nature of the goods being transported. See also Gillette
(2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 161, 174; Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia
Journal of International Law 707 at 737.
85 [1954] 2 QB 402 at 419.
86 Ramberg ‘Why revise Incoterms?’ in Ramberg et al (eds) Incoterms 2000: A forum of
experts (ICC 2000) 11–12; Incoterms 2000 (the ofﬁcial rules), ‘Introduction’ para 9.2.
87 Mak (2014) at 8–11; Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at
715–716; Cuniberti (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 384.
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have speciﬁc knowledge of it.88 Through its gap-ﬁlling function, usage
protects the expectations of parties who anticipate compliance with it
from others engaged in the same trade.89 These expectations are based
on policy considerations of good faith and reasonableness, but also on
the assumption that the custom represents what most traders in those
circumstances would contract for. Very often the parties to a contract
deliberately fail to provide for all contingencies of the contract, leaving
so-called ‘gaps’ to be ﬁlled by the default law or by trade usage. That
happens mostly in circumstances where the likelihood or risk that the
contingency would materialise is signiﬁcantly smaller than the ex post
facto costs if it would. In those circumstances, the parties are content
that either the default law of the contract or trade usage would provide
an efﬁcient gap-ﬁller as it represents what most parties would contract
for if they had the opportunity to do so.90
Doubts over contractual parties’ awareness of trade usage and
whether it is what most parties would want are nothing new. During the
drafting stages of the CISG, socialist and developing countries expressed
this as their main concerns. Their argument was that commercial usages
are formed by a small group of countries, mainly from the developed
and industrialised world, and, therefore, did not express worldwide
practices. These countries feared that, as the economically weaker party,
imperialistic customs would be forced onto them.91 History has shown
that trade usage can indirectly prevent developing countries from
entering into international trade transactions while, at the same time, it
can protect the developed countries’ dominance of the trade. Because of
its stronger commercial power, Britain was, for example, able to dictate
that the export of coal should take place on CIF terms and the import of
cotton on FOB terms. By structuring their contracts with their trade
partners in this manner, they could, in both instances, choose the carrier
and, thus, were placed in a position to expand their merchant marine.92
Due to the fact that most traders tend to contract out of usages they
88 Pamboukis ‘The concept and function of usages in the United Nations Convention on
the International Sale of Goods’ (2005–2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 107 at 111.
89 Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 708; Gillette (2004) 5
Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 163.
90 Mak (2014) at 11; Gillette (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 157;
Bernstein (2015) 110Northwestern University LR 63 at 95; Bernstein (2013) 12.
91 Bonell ‘Art 9 — usages and practices’ in Bianca & Bonell (eds) Commentary on the
International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (Fred B Rothman & Co 1987) 105.
This was the reason for the compromise reached in art 9(2) CISG. See alsoGoode (1997) 46(1)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 16; Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of
International Law 707 at 718–719.
92 See Cutler (Cambridge University Press 2003) at 221 for the arguments of Alan Cafruny.
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are aware of, Bernstein found that the assumption that trade usage
represents what most traders would contract for if they had the
opportunity to do so is false.93 Moreover, data obtained from the ICC
Arbitration Court on the number of arbitration cases that indicate the
lex mercatoria as a choice of law accounts for less than 1 per cent of
matters heard by the tribunal.94 Thus, it cannot be said that trade usage
routinely represents what most people want, especially if one takes into
consideration the scale on which standard form contracts are used in the
context of commercial transactions.95 Standard contracts and industry
rules formulated by trade organisations regulate the contractual rela-
tionship between the parties in detail and for the most part replace the
default law and other gap-ﬁllers such as trade usage.96 These contracts
are more precise and better tailored to a particular trade and its needs.
They also provide for private dispute resolution systems, which are
better geared to the trade and are mostly conducted by arbitrators.97
Furthermore, when it comes to the use of trade usage for interpretative
purposes and gap-ﬁlling, Bernstein’s study found that traders are not in
favour of contextualised interpretation as that is more than often based
on a ﬁctional intent. Courts often overwrite the written provisions of
their contracts with usages that are inconsistent with the express words
of the contract.98 Consequently, traders prefer a formalistic interpreta-
tion that keeps to the express wording and plain meaning of the words.
In the context of trade associations, it was found that arbitrators also
prefer amore formalistic approach.99On the other hand, it has been said
that, in the context of the CISG, arbitrators have managed to invoke
trade usages that are less controversial as here the application of usage is
limited to customs that are easily veriﬁable, considered legally binding
and that do not replace the intentions of contractual parties.100
93 Bernstein (2013) 12–14.
94 Cuniberti (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 403.
95 Linarelli (2003) 48Wayne LR 1387 at 1439–1440; Bernstein (2013) at 21.
96 Bernstein (2013) 14. See also, in general, Bernstein (1996) 144University of Pennsylvania
LR 1765 at 1765 as regards commodity contracts.
97 Bernstein (1996) 144University of Pennsylvania LR 1765 at 1770–1771.
98 Bernstein (2013) 21; Bernstein (2015) 110 Northwestern University LR 63 at 69–70.
Moreover, Mak (2014) 12 and Gillette (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at
169–170 refer to a ‘homeward trend’ that occurs when judges deﬁne trade usage in an
international context.
99 Bernstein (1996) 144University of Pennsylvania LR 1765 at 1769–1770.
100 Gillette (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 178–179.
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(c) Trade usage is certain in content, clear and saves
transaction costs
One of the main features of custom is that it represents an ‘international
language’ that transcends geographic borders. It trumps national law
and even conﬂicting interpretations of international law and obviates
the need to resort to the rules of private international law, which saves
transaction costs.101 Trade usage and custom are more cost-effective
than express contractual terms which, often at the risk of mistakes and
misunderstandings, have to be translated into foreign languages. 102
However, despite its harmonisation function, international usage
does not operate universally and can differ from country to country or
from one trade to the next. Often there is little agreement on the content
of trade usage, even where it had its origins in closed groups.103 This is
illustrated by trade terms where the understanding of the oldest and
most well-known terms, FOB and CIF, is dependent on the applicable
law, the trade sector or even the port where it is applied. These
differences in understanding give rise to different forms of FOB and CIF
terms as is evident from the different standard form contracts available
in the commodity trade.104 Moreover, the common understanding of
usage tends to shift as commercial practices evolve in reaction to
changing commercial realities. Also, the modern economy is no longer
characterised by homogeneous ways of doing business as in the past,
which makes it more difﬁcult for consistent practices to generate and, at
the same time, for merchants to become aware of such practices.105
Certainty is one of the basic prerequisites for custom or trade usage.
Where commercial parties disagree about the content of a usage and the
obligations that it entails, the rule-making function of trade usage is
moved from the mercantile community to the courts and tribunals. In
these instances, judges and arbitrators have to establish the common
understanding of such usage in the trade. Unless a judge or arbitrator is
familiar with the particular custom, expert evidence is required to give
101 Michaels (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447 at 463; Cuniberti (2014)
52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 392.
102 Gillette (1999) 39Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 724.
103 See, in general, Bernstein (2013) and Bernstein (1996) 144University of Pennsylvania LR
1765.
104 Such as those available under the GAFTA and the FOSFA standard contracts. For
criticism on the vagueness, lack of precision and comprehensiveness of commercial custom,
see in general Cuniberti (2014) 52Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 390–391 and
Fassberg (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 67 at 77.
105 Bernstein (2013) 22–29; Mak (2014) 10; De Ly (2005–2006) 25 Journal of Law and
Commerce 1 at 5.
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meaning to it. This is often easier said than done. The trade context in
which the usage originated and developed plays an important role in its
understanding.106 There is no international court which presides on
disputes of this nature and one is to rely on national courts to determine
the content and meaning of international commercial practices, and
thereby protect the harmonisation function of trade usage.107 Interpre-
tation costs could, thus, affect the efﬁciency of trade usage adversely.
Where disputes are heard by arbitrators who have special knowledge
of the trade or by a specialised court such as a commercial court, the
danger of divergent interpretation can be reduced. Judges, arbitrators
and legal scholarship can fulﬁl a ‘spokesman’ function.108 In the context
of international sales, arbitrators often deduce existing international
trade usage from international conventions such as the CISG,109 or from
uniform rules such as the UNIDROIT Principles.110 However, because
international conventions are primarily state endeavours, drafted by
lawyers and academics and negotiated by diplomats, they do not always
reﬂect practices and usages of the commercial community.111As unwrit-
ten usage is inherently uncertain and develops and changes over time, it
is questionable whether usage could ever be effectively reduced to
writing. Can a convention as a relatively static document truly reﬂect or
express usage? Furthermore, does a convention always express usage as
is, or does it become changed in the drafting process? Is the notion of
codifying existing usage, especially on the international level, perhaps
purely a myth?112
The main difﬁculty with unwritten and uncodiﬁed usage is to
106 Gillette (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 165; Gillette (1999) 39
Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 716.
107 Gillette (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 707 at 711–712. See also Mak
(2014) 12 for the dangers of a ‘homeward’ interpretation.
108 Dalhuisen (2008) 18 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 339 at 366–367;
Dalhuisen (Hart 2010) 161, n 344; DiMatteo 2013 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1
at 7; Goode (1997) 46(1) International and Comparative LawQuarterly 1 at 6; Gillette (2004) 5
Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 179.
109 Cuniberti (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 381, 394. See also
ICC arbitration case no 5713 of 1989 as discussed by Goode (1997) 46(1) International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 18 et seq.
110 Goode (1997) 46(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 26; Cuniberti
(2014) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 394.
111 Goode (1997) 46(1) International and Comparative LawQuarterly 1 at 22. In the context
of the international carriage of goods by sea, the Hamburg Rules provide an example of an
international convention that was not favourably received by the international mercantile
community for that reason. See also, in general, the discussion under III(a).
112 Goode (1997) 46(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 19.
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establish its existence and whether it is regularly observed.113 Where
unwritten trade usage is well known and regularly observed by mer-
chants over a long period of time, courts take judicial notice of the usage
and there is no need to prove its existence or content.114However, where
a judge or arbitrator cannot take judicial notice of the usage, expert
evidence is required. Often that is not available and reliance is to be
made on cursory evidence by employees who sometimes testify in a
manner that suits the employer, resulting in the usage being to the
beneﬁt of only one party. Unwritten usage, therefore, creates an
opportunity for strategic behaviour from the party who claims to rely on
the usage.115
As was mentioned already, arbitrators are more successful in inter-
preting contracts with reference to trade usage.116Moreover, as interna-
tional business organisations and trade associations are increasingly
involved in the creation, formulation and development of mercantile
customs and usages they are becoming more easily accessible. This
facilitates both their recognition and application, and simpliﬁes the issue
of proof.117 These organisations are in the position to collect and
investigate practices and usages, evaluate their efﬁciency and then codify
the most optimal practice into clear and certain language, either in the
form of standardised rules or standard form contracts that keep up with
the inherent dynamic nature of international custom.118 This would
mean that standardising authorities not only have to codify usages but
also have to standardise their meanings.
IV CONCLUSION
National laws, international conventions and other instruments of
harmonisation all recognise the interpretative and gap-ﬁlling role of
trade usage. Trade usage even takes precedence over the dispositive
113 Goode (1997) 46(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 12–13. See also
the observations of Corbett J inGolden Cape Fruits at 646A–C, which was cited and applied by
Eksteen J in Emadyl Industries CC t/a Raydon Industries (Pty) Ltd v Formex Engineering 2012
(4) SA 29 (ECP) paras 50–52.
114 (Note) ‘Custom and trade usage: its application to commercial dealings and the
common law’ (1955) 55 Columbia LR 1192 at 1206.
115 Bernstein (2013) 17; Bernstein (2015) 110Northwestern University LR 63 at 67.
116 Gillette (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 179; Wiener Katz ‘The
relative costs of incorporating trade usage into domestic versus international sales contracts:
Comments on Clayton Gillette, institutional design and international usages under the CISG’
(2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 181 at 186–187.
117 On the advantages of self-regulation, seeMak (2014) 15. See also, in general, Berger The
Creeping Codification of the New LexMercatoria 2 ed (Kluwer Law International 2010).
118 Dalhuisen (Hart 2010) 161.
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substantive law of the contract. The rationale for this role lies in
assumptions of legal efﬁciency. Trade usage developed as a form of
self-regulation by the commercial community itself and, thus, as a
uniform set of optimal and efﬁcient practices that the participants in that
trade regard as binding on them. Because these practices are well known
and regularly observed in a particular trade across geographical and legal
boundaries there is no need to agree to them explicitly. This reduces
transaction costs.
This article has set out to challenge the traditional assumptions on
which this rationale is based in order to come to a conclusion onwhether
trade usage still constitutes law made by merchants for merchants that
most traders would prefer to be bound to, or whether this is simply an
illusion.
The analysis has found that, although these assumptions may still
have merit, the fact that they originated in a different time must be
considered. The way business is conducted has changed signiﬁcantly
since medieval times when the lex mercatoria functioned as an indepen-
dent system of law based onmercantile custom. Apart from the fact that
the existence of the ancient lawmerchant has been placed in dispute, in a
globalised world international sales transactions no longer take place in
closed circles or networks. Traditional seller–buyer relationships are
increasingly replaced by contracts concluded over the internet or by
more complex contracts such as supply-chain, value added, just-in-
time, out-sourcing and other collaborative forms of contracting. In
these contexts, standard contracts often regulate the contractual rela-
tionship. Due to rapid developments in technology it is more difﬁcult
for trade usage to become established in these contexts.119 At the same
time, it would inhibit the use of trade usage to interpret the terms of
these standard forms of contract.
Furthermore, international trade of the twenty-ﬁrst century is charac-
terised by ﬁerce competition which requires that players should be
innovative. Competition precludes businesses from sharing their prac-
tices with competitors, which means that it is less likely that interna-
tional trade usage will develop spontaneously or become established.120
While usage is deﬁned as trade practices which are followed within a
particular trade on a regular basis for a certain period of time, the new
119 Bernstein (2015) 110 Northwestern University LR 63 at 100–104. According to De Ly
(2005–2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 1 at 5, as a result of globalisation and
technological changes, custom and usage are becoming less relevant and will be replaced by
courses of dealing between the same parties.
120 Bernstein (2013) 28.
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face of international sales is hardly suitable for the development of
practices over time. However, the analysis has shown that the traditional
requirement that usage must be long established is no longer strictly
applied.121 The time requirement is not completely irrelevant, though,
as recentness in origin might have a negative bearing on the other
requirements, namely whether the practice is well known and regularly
observed.
As international trade is conducted across a wider scope on a global
scale it makes it even more difﬁcult to identify trade usage and prove its
content.122 Where the content of usage is uncertain or in dispute, it is
difﬁcult to prove that a trade usage exists and transaction costs will be
increased rather than reduced. As with all instruments of harmonisa-
tion, uniform interpretation is paramount for the achievement of legal
certainty.123 This end depends on the judiciary and the arbitrators who
have to apply trade usage. The dynamic nature of trade usage and its
ability to evolve in reaction to change increases its efﬁciency but at the
same time creates legal uncertainty that can reduce the efﬁciency of the
contract.124 Trade usage, therefore, often presents as a dichotomy of
legal ﬂexibility and certainty.Moreover, the fear of network and learning
costs can determerchants from parting with the status quo in favour of a
new, albeit more efﬁcient, practice.125
Whether international trade conventions and other instruments of
commercial harmonisation express trade usage is questionable as they
are relatively static documents,126 but that their provisions are based on
general principles of international trade is not to be denied. However, as
a gap-ﬁller trade usage can supplement the provisions of conventions so
that they will manage to remain relevant long after trade conditions that
existed at the time of their drafting have changed.
It can be concluded that, apart from the role that it continues to play
in commercial arbitration, unwritten trade usage will become less
signiﬁcant in international sales transactions due to problems of proof
and the fast-changing nature of modern commercial practices. The
121 Dalhuisen (Hart 2010) 155, n 325; 160–161 even suggests that custom can change
overnight and still be binding.
122 Gillette (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 167–168; Katz (2004) 5
Chicago Journal of International Law 181 at 183.
123 A uniform law per se is no guarantee that its provisions will be interpreted or applied
uniformly. See Andersen ‘The global jurisconsultorium of the CISG revisited’ (2009) 13(1)
Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 43 at 45.
124 Mak (2014) 8–9.
125 Gillette (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 160.
126 Goode (1997) 46(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 3 is of the
opinion that conventions do not ‘reproduce the status quo, they change it’.
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harmonisation function of trade usage has moved from unwritten usage
to codiﬁed trade usage and standard form contracts formulated by
international business organisations and trade associations. Dalhuisen
regards the role of trade organisations as increasingly important. These
organisations are in a position to identify efﬁcient practices and to
standardise them into standard contracts or rules that recognise the
dynamic role of mercantile custom. This way they need not wait for the
practices to become long established and widely recognised before rules
that are efﬁcient and desirable ﬁnd application in international trade.127
Organisations such as the ICC standardise mercantile custom to ensure
legal certainty and clarity and address the problems of proof connected
to unwritten usages.128 At the same time they disseminate information
and educate merchants on the use of the most efﬁcient customs and
practices, which can prevent inefﬁcient practices frombecoming locked-
in.129 Moreover, contractual parties do not have to carry the burden of
high transaction costs brought about by network and learning effects as
these costs are now largely carried by the standardising organisation.
Where the law-making function of trade usage is transferred to institu-
tions, they can formulate trade usage proactively to facilitate efﬁcient
trade instead of merely reacting to and standardising existing practices.
Standardised and codiﬁed usages are therefore no longer restricted to
usages and customs that have developed spontaneously in the trade over
time. Business organisations can identify and even anticipate efﬁcient
practices to facilitate international trade in an organised and responsible
manner through regular revisions that enhance the efﬁciency of trade
usage. In the context of standard contracts formulated by trade associa-
tions, the application of trade usage is furthermore facilitated by internal
systems for dispute resolution, which are better equipped for this task
than the court system.
Whether trade usages still solely constitute rules made by merchants
for their own use and beneﬁt is therefore questionable. However, the
answer to this question might also depend on how you interpret the
notion of law made by merchants for merchants. Codiﬁed trade usages,
such as those formulated by the ICC, function as a contractual opt-in
mechanism, which means that merchants are free to use these rules to
regulate their contractual relationships as and when they prefer to do so.
127 Dalhuisen (Hart 2010) 160–161. Also see n 342 where he refers to the notion of ‘instant
customary law’ as a source of public international law.
128 For example, the Incoterms and the UCP. Other examples are the ICMA in the
Eurobondmarket.
129 Gillette (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 157 at 161, 174.
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In this context, trade usage functions on the basis of party autonomy and
by electing to make use of codiﬁed usages to regulate their contracts,
merchants still play an active role in the legal regulation of their own
contracts even though these usages are no longer exclusively made by
merchants for their own use. In the end, codiﬁed usages are formulated
for the use and beneﬁt of merchants with the main aim of harmonising
and facilitating international trade. As for unwritten usages, parties are
free to exclude their operation contractually if they do not want to be
bound by them.
Through the ages merchants have supplemented the substantive law
of their contracts by means of the self-regulating quality of mercantile
custom. This will continue to happen in the future, albeit in a different
and more structured form. As international business organisations and
transnational companies increasingly become involved with the formu-
lation of privately-generated law to supplement the law of the state,
trade usage will no longer be restricted to law made by merchants for
merchants but will be used to facilitate international trade as part of ‘a
law for commerce’ which moves beyond the state.130
130 Michaels (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447 at 466–468.
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